This paper explores the relationship between employee rights and dividend policy across countries. Using labor right index as a proxy for agency costs of employees, we test the association between labor rights and dividend policies across countries. The empirical results reveal that labor rights are negatively related to firms' decision to pay dividends and dividend payment amounts. This relationship is reinforced to be more salient in civil countries where shareholder rights are weak. The empirical results are robust by controlling for test model specification, and a series of countrylevel control variables.
Introduction
Under the agency costs hypothesis, dividends, along with corporate governance mechanisms, are used to reduce agency costs and thus improve firm value. The extensive research investigates how dividends can be used as a tool to mitigate agency costs of managers which result from the interest conflict between shareholders and managers. While the interest conflict between shareholders and managers is the major focus of corporate governance pattern in Anglo-Saxon countries, different corporate governance mechanisms exist in many other countries. Therefore, the agent-principal conflicts might be different in other countries as well. In additional to agency problems of managers, agency problems of employees are quite salient in some countries. This paper examines the relationship between agency costs of employees and dividend policy across countries, using labor right as a proxy for agency costs of employees.
Essentially, the dividend is a vehicle through which companies distribute wealth and investors realize investment return. Firms also pay dividends for corporate governance purpose such as to reduce agency costs and to provide a signal to outsiders. Companies operate in various business environments under different societal institutions. In each society, to maximize their own benefits, various stakeholders such as shareholders, managers, workers, and creditors will utilize their influence to take part in wealth distribution. With regard to dividends, those influences will be applied on either supply or demand side of dividends. Dividend policy is a consequence of the interaction between supply and demand of dividends. When this interaction reaches its equilibrium point, dividend policy is determined. When this equilibrium point is reached, the powers of various interest groups are also balanced. Therefore, for across country analysis, to study dividend policy is to explore the interaction among various interest groups and to examine how that interaction affects supply and demand of dividends.
In different institutional environments, interest groups of firms have different influence in corporation decision makings. For example, through a survey, Allen (2009) finds that ninety-seven percent of Japanese managers, fifty-nine percent of German managers, and sixty percent French managers believe employees' job security is more important than dividends while only eleven percent of American managers and ten percent of British managers have this belief. To shed light on the essentials of corporate finance decision makings around the world, we need to explore each stakeholder's role in corporate finance. While the impacts of managers and creditors on dividend policy are well studied, the role of employees in dividend policy across countries remains unrevealed.
When employees in Germany and Japan can influence corporate decision making directly through their seats in corporation boards, not every country in the world has such a codetermination corporate governance mechanism. Consequently, employees in countries without codetermination corporate governance devices will seek alternatives inside and outside companies to protect their interests. Within a firm, employees can protect themselves through organizing unions, negotiate individually for better terms, or strike. Outside a company, employees can seek legislation, appeal to the media, or file lawsuits to pursue protection. The above procedures provide protection for employees directly. However, the availability of those procedures differs country by country, constrained by a country's political and legal systems. Especially, a country's labor law and regulatory regime grant employees such rights as union formation, striking, and bargaining power. Botero et al. (2004) recognize that when a country's labor law and regulatory system provides labor rights for employees, it also provides protection for employees by applying some restrictions to shareholders. For example, labor law or regulation can protect employees by making it harder and more costly to fire employees. From shareholders' standpoint, strong labor laws widen the gap between shareholders and employees and cause agency costs of employees to be raised.
Since employee rights granted by law and regulatory regime are exogenous, shareholders will seek a reduction of agency costs of employees within a corporation. Basically, when a corporation's free cash flows are reduced, employees are less likely to obtain explicit or implicit benefits. As a result, the agency costs of employees will be mitigated in such a way. Agency costs theory suggests that cash dividends remove corporations' free cash flows and thus reduce agency costs.
This paper explores the role of employees in dividend policy under different legal and political regimes across countries, by addressing the following research questions:
1. What is the relationship between employee rights and corporations' decision to pay dividends across countries? 2. How do employee rights affect amounts of dividend payout across countries? 3. Taking all stakeholders into account, how does interaction among shareholders, creditors, and employees affect dividend policy across countries? 4. What is the impact of country-level employee protection level on corporations' dividend policies in different country groups? This paper contributes to the broader corporate governance literature on the strategic interaction between shareholders and employees. It considers all stakeholders when studying agency problems. It tests the impact of agency costs of labor on dividend policy and provides a new perspective to interpreting international variation in dividend policy in the world. The results obtained from this paper help us to understand dividend policy in different countries with various corporate governance mechanisms and fill significant gaps in the literature on agency problems.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Following the introduction, a review of existing studies and a conceptual framework are discussed in section I. Section II describes data and research methodologies. Empirical results are discussed in section III. The conclusion is in section IV.
I. Conceptual Framework
Dividend policy is affected both by firm level factors and by country level factors (see Allen and Michaely (2003) for comprehensive reviews). At the firm level, firm size, leverage, investment growth opportunities, tax, firm age, corporate governance characteristics such as ownership structure, board structure, distribution of voting rights, and distribution of cash flow rights all influence firm dividend policy (Bhattacharya (1979) , Rozeff (1982) , Easterbrook (1984), Miller and Rock (1985) , Jensen (1986) , Fama and French (2001) , DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2005) , among others). At the country level, to our knowledge, legal factors such as legal origin, protection for minority shareholders, and enforcement of law are relevant to dividend payout (LLSV 2000a ).
This complexity of dividend determinants means that none of the various dividend policy theories developed to explain dividend payout behavior and its variations in dividend behavior across countries are perfect.
International studies on dividend policy extend dividend theories to an international context.
Usually research in this area analyzes dividends either in specific non-US countries (Goergen, Renneboog, and Silva (2004), Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis, and Wong (2005) , among others) or in certain country groups such as emerging countries or European countries (Faccio, Lang, and Young, 2001; Aivazian et al., 2003a Aivazian et al., , 2003b .
Research on international dividend policy has focused primarily on testing validation of various dividend theories in international context using foreign countries' firm samples. Few studies examine the impact of agency costs of stakeholders on corporate finance based on differing natures of legal and political systems across countries.
Legal and political systems affect finance through various channels. In particular, they provide heterogeneous protection for different interest groups in a corporate context, cause power and benefit imbalanced among stakeholders, and shape characteristics of agency problems of stakeholders.
Tirole (2001, 2006) asserts that corporations select optimal investment and financing decisions within the constraints of legal and political environments to which they belong. While agency problems have great impacts on dividends, what shape characteristics of agency problems cause lots of interests.
There are essentially two explanations for international differences in agency problems of stakeholders. The "law and finance" theory (LLSV (1997 (LLSV ( , 1998 (LLSV ( , 1999 , Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2001 Levine ( , 2003 ) suggests that legal origin rooted in historical accident determines investor protection and then financial market development. Investor protection and financial market development level generate corporate governance mechanisms in which stakeholders interact with each other. Political economics school studies benefits and protection of employees, and more importantly, the interaction between employees, managers, and shareholders under various political environments. In the "political economics" framework (Pagano and Volpin (2005 , 2006 ), Rajan and Zingales (2003 , Roe (2003 Roe ( , 2004 ), researchers argue that it is the interaction between different political interest groups that shapes legal rules and investor protection, with the latter influences financial market development and derives corporate governance mechanisms. shareholders and employees induce employees to seek for protection for their interests and job security through any available channels.
The ways employees use to protect their benefits include labor contracting, direct involvement in corporate governance mechanism through assigning employee representation on the firm's board of directors, and the use of their political voting right to put pressure on legislation so as to get protection from government, depending on a country's legal and political institutions. Hansmann and Kraakman (2004) argue that protecting for employees through labor law and labor regulatory mechanism is more efficient and strong and can prevent employees from exploitation at the hand of shareholders. When employees obtain more benefits from stronger employee protection provided by a country's labor law and regulation, those benefits are at expenses of shareholders' increased agency costs of employees.
It is a country's legal and regulatory regime that provides valid protection for employees. Easterbrook (1984) ). Less free cash flows also lower employees expectation to obtain extra benefits from the firm even the labor law and regulatory regime provide high employee right in that country. Therefore, dividends can also be used to reduce agency costs of employees.
Given a country's labor regulatory regime, employees prefer low dividends because more free cash flows remained in a firm allow employees to have stronger bargaining to pursue high wages and job security. On the one hand, paying cash dividends can reduce free cash flows and hence mitigate agency costs. On the other hand, from the perspective of corporate finance, dividends payment is a distribution of wealth to investors. Comprehensively, corporations will apply different dividend policies in the reduction of agency costs of employees, depending on employee rights at country-level. We test the relationship between county-level employee rights and dividend policy across countries through the following hypothesis. Using country-level labor right as a proxy for employee protection (Botero et al (2004) ) and creditor right as a proxy for creditor protection (LLSV (2006)), we hypothesize:
The stronger the labor right, the fewer cash dividends the company will pay.
When labor right is strong, more employees' benefits are granted by labor law and regulation.
Consequently, high employee benefits will take up cash and reduce cash flows distributed to shareholders via cash dividends. Especially in countries where protection for investors is weak, the dominance of strong labor right will cause corporations not to pay or pay fewer cash dividends.
This is the case of civil law countries whose protection for investors is weaker than common law countries. Therefore, we assume the negative relationship between labor right and dividends will be more obvious in civil law countries.
II. Data and Methodology

Data sources and sample selection
We collect firm data from Differences in accounting practices across countries might cause a discrepancy in financial reporting. To avoid this bias, we select firms with fully consolidated accounting statements only (consol = F in Global Industrial file). Following the literature on dividends (Aivazian et al. (2003) , and LLSV (2000a), we exclude financial firms (6999>SIC code>6000), and utility firms (4999>SIC code>4900). We also dropped firms with negative equity, negative sales revenue, missing value of total assets, negative dividends, and negative cash flows, and firms with dividends larger than sales revenue.
We match firm-level data from Global Vantage with our country-level data from various resources and require our main three country-level explanatory variables, shareholder rights index Labor rights index is used as a proxy for agency costs of employees. Roe (2004) asserts that a marginal increase in benefits of employees would be a marginal decrease in shareholders' value and that strong labor right provided by legal and political systems in fact cause agency costs to increase. Therefore, we use measures for labor rights as proxies for agency costs of employees.
There is an extensive literature on the relationship between labor rights and law and regulation of labor (Besley and Burgess (2003), Heckman and Pages-Serra (2000), and Lazear (1990)). Those studies check the law and regulatory provisions on such aspects as the difficulty of firing employees, the costs of firing employees, and the easiness of hiring employees and explore how employees' benefits are affected due to the differences in those provisions. In alignment with the above approach, Botero et al. (2004) analyze the regulation of labor comprehensively and suggest that regulation of labor markets protects employees in the following four areas: (1) forbidding discrimination in the labor market; (2) restricting the ranges of feasible contracts and raising costs of laying off employees; (3) empowering labor unions to negotiate with employers; and (4) regulating social insurance for employees. They develop a group of indices to measure for employee protection in each aspect. With regard to employees' power to pursue maximum benefits, Botero et al. (2004) use the labor union power index as a proxy for labor rights.
Methodology and research design
The major focus is to examine the impact of agency costs of employees on dividends. To measure the association between country-specific characteristics and agency costs of stakeholders, we use labor union power (LR) to measure for labor rights, a proxy for agency costs of employees.
To test corporations' dividend policy across countries, we use the Logit model to test the decision to pay dividends whereas Tobit model is used to test a number of dividends paid. The
Logit model is specified as follows (firm subscription suppressed):
Payer---the dividend-payer dummy variable, equals to one if total dividends paid are positive, and zero otherwise;
RE---the retained earnings divided by total equity for firm i at year t;
ROA---the net income divided by total assets for firm i at year t;
Cash---the cash balance scaled by total assets for firm i at year t;
TE---the shareholders' equity scaled by total assets for firm i at year t;
Size---the log of total assets in US dollars for firm i at year t;
G ---the sales growth rate, G= log (salest/salest-1) for each firm;
SR---the shareholder rights index at country level CR---the creditor rights index at country level LR---the labor rights index at the country level.
Since payout ratios are censored variables larger than zero, a Tobit model is used to test country and firm determinants of a number of dividends paid. The Tobit model is specified as follows (firm subscriptions suppressed): Consistent with LLSV (2000a), we use dividends to sales ratio as our payout ratio for each firm i at year t, Div_S, defined by cash dividend paid to common and preferred stockholders divided by net sales. Durnev and Kim (2005) argue that the differences in accounting practices across countries make the direct comparison of firm-level data biased. However, the inclusion of legal variables, in particular, anti-self dealing index, will partially take the accounting standards differences across countries into account, and therefore, control for these differences (Djankov et al. (2008)). Another bias may arise from the possibility that firms in different countries may have a different degree of incentive to manipulate accounting earnings through accounting tricks. Using dividend to sales ratio will mitigate this bias because the sales depend less on accounting conventions and are less likely to manipulate, as argued by LLSV (2000a). Using dividends to sales ratio also allows us to keep a larger sample size than using dividends to earnings ratio, because using dividends to earnings ratios results in eliminating firms with negative earnings.
For any missing values of total dividends items in Global Industrial file, we use the total amount of dividends paid from Global Issue file as a supplement. The total amount of dividends paid is an accumulated amount of dividends paid during a fiscal year in Global Issue file adjusted by currency exchange rate. The currency exchange rate information is from Global Currency file. Table 3 provides summary statistics for the dividend payout.
< Insert Table 3 here> Selection of independent variables in the Logit and Tobit models is based on dividend theories, following prior research on dividends. Dividend theories include the agency costs theory, the signaling theory, the catering theory, the pecking order theory, and the life-cycle theory.
Different dividend theories predict firm-level factors play different roles in the determination of dividend policy.
Consistent with the dividend theories, we use the following variables to control for firm-level factors: RE is the retained earnings divided by total equity. RE is widely used to test the life-cycle theory (DeAngelo et al (2006), Fama and French (2002)). Cash is the cash balance scaled by total assets. TE is the shareholders' equity scaled by total assets. G is the growth rate computed by annual log sales growth. LLSV (2000a) provide an argument for why sales growth is a good proxy for investment opportunities in across countries analysis. They assert that sales are less likely to be manipulated in financial statements considering the different accounting principles and conventions across countries. Thus sales growth rate is a more reliable measure for growth opportunities than other growth rates. Firm size is measured by nature log of total assets in US dollars, as used by
Brockman et al (2009) and Faccio et al. (2001) . Prior empirical studies show that dividend payment is highly related to profitability. Return on assets (ROA) is widely used as a profitability measure in literature (Bhattacharya 1979; Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan 2002) . ROA is computed using the net income divided by total assets. Table 4 lists descriptive statistics for firm-level independent variables.
Following the prior literature, we also include other country-level variables to control country-specific economic factors. Table 5 lists all country-level variables.
< Insert Table 4 and 5 here>
III. Empirical results
Summary statistics
Summary statistics is presented in Table 3 . Following the literature, we divide dividends sample into two sub-groups based on a country's legal origin (LLSV (1998)): common law countries and civil law countries. Table 3 panel A shows summary statistics for common law countries. In the common law country group, the median of payer ratio is 69.37% and the mean and median of payout ratio are 1.99% and 2.01%, respectively. In the civil law country group, the median of payer ratio, the mean, and median of payout ratio are 58.98%, 1.5%, and 1.44%, <Insert Table 3 here>
Firm-level determinants of dividend policy
We start our analysis by running a regression using firm-level variables only. To address the outliers issue, we winsorize all firm-level variables at 5% level.
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We test firm determinants of a dividend policy by implementing the Logit model and the Tobit model with firm-level independent variables only. The regression results are presented in Tables 6 and 7 . To control for industry effect, we run the Logit and Tobit models both using industry segment sample separately and using pooled sample. To get an unbiased estimation, we use robust clustering estimator of variance, controlling for the interdependence across observations. < Insert Table 6 As discussed previously, we use country-level labor rights index as a proxy for agency costs of employees. Our analysis is implemented by running the pooled sample ordinary least square (OLS) regression with year and industry fixed-effects. Robust clustering standard errors are estimated to control for interdependence across firms.
Labor rights and dividend policy
We test the likelihood to pay dividends and amount of dividend payments under different labor With the same logic, we examine the relationship between employee rights and dividend policy across countries. Controlling for firm-level factors, we run year-and industry-fixed-effect Logit model with firm clustering standard error estimation using pooled sample. We also implement the same regression using sub-samples: common law country group, and civil law country group. To test the impacts of labor rights on dividend amounts, we implement both Tobit and OLS regression using pooled samples for three groups: common law country group, civil law country group, and the whole country group. To test the interaction and compounded effect of all stakeholders, we add creditor rights and shareholder rights indices to our regressions as control variables. The Logit model results are presented in Table 8 and the Tobit model results are reported in Table 9 .
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In Logit model, the coefficients of the labor rights index are significantly negative in full sample and in the civil law country sample. In common law country sample, the coefficient of labor rights index is significantly positive. When we test the SR, CR, and LR together, we document significantly negative coefficients of SR in full sample and civil law sample.
In Tobit model, coefficients of LR are insignificantly negative. The subsample regressions generate significant results, positive for common law countries and negative for civil countries. The coefficient of CR in civil law country sample becomes significantly negative. We use VIF to check the multicollinearity and the VIF does not show serious multicollinearity problem.
< Insert Table 8 and 9 here>
In both Logit and Tobit models, the civil law country samples generate consistent results for LR coefficients. The negative coefficient of LR reveals the negative relationship between labor rights and dividends, The results support our hypothesis, in which we assume the negative relationship between employee rights and corporations' dividends. Unlike debt repayment, dividend distribution is not a firm's obligation. The major source of dividends is corporations' profits, after all expense and costs including labor costs are deducted. As a result, shareholders are harder to remove free cash flows through paying dividends when they face stronger labor rights from labor law and regulations. This inability to mitigate agency costs of employees is exacerbated when shareholder rights are weak. That's why our tests results show the negative coefficients are more salient in civil law countries whose shareholder rights are weaker than common law countries. 
Robustness tests
This paper is to explore the impacts of country-level employee rights on dividend policy across countries, using firm-level variables as control variables. To address the omitting variable issue, we run the robust tests by adding additional countrylevel controlling variables and re-run the two-stage regression. Following the prior research, we add both country-level corporate governance quality variables such as government quality index and ownership concentration index. The regression results are included in Table 11 . < Insert Table 11 here> The above robust tests results show that the coefficients of our major target variable: labor rights index (LR), stays statistically significant. These significant results suggest that labor rights are negatively related to dividend payout, and this negative relation becomes stronger when shareholder rights are weak.
IV. Conclusion
This paper explores the relationship between employee rights and dividend policy across countries. The results of the study reveal the impacts of agency costs of employees on dividend policies are given a country's legal and political framework.
Based on the agency problem theory in finance, agency costs arise when the interests of agents are not aligned with those of principals. Current corporate governance theory focuses primarily on agency costs of managers and existing literature studies extensively on this aspect.
This paper examines an interest group that is ignored by corporate governance studies. This interest group is employees of firms. With a different utility function from shareholders, employees seek various ways such as labor contracting, unionization, and the use of their voting rights on Politian to maximize their benefits and interests within firms. The increase in employee right is at expense of shareholders and agency costs of employees arise due to this reason. Constrained by a country's labor regulatory regime, shareholders will use firm behaviors to mitigate employees bargaining power so as to reduce the agency costs of employees. Paying cash dividends is one of such behaviors. Using labor right index as a proxy for agency costs of employees, we test the association between labor rights and dividend policies across countries.
Our empirical results reveal that labor rights are negatively related to firms' decision to pay dividends and dividend payment amounts. This relationship is reinforced to be more salient in civil countries where shareholder rights are weak.
The empirical results are robust by controlling for test model specification, and a series of country-level control variables. This is the first study that examines agency costs of employees in dividend policy explicitly.
This paper makes contributions to the literature on agency problems. It sheds light on the interaction relationship among shareholders, creditors, and employees. By testing the impact of agency costs of equity, agency costs of debt, and agency costs of labors on dividend policy, it suggests a new standpoint to study the agency costs of stakeholder. The empirical results of this study provide a new perspective to interpret international variation in dividend policies across countries. RE is the retained earnings divided by total equity. ROA is the net income divided by total assets. Cash is the cash balance scaled by total assets. TE is the shareholders' equity scaled by total assets. Size is the log of total assets in US dollars. G is the growth rate computed by annual log sales growth. ROA is the net income divided by total assets. Cash is the cash balance scaled by total assets. TE is the shareholders' equity scaled by total assets. Size is the log of total assets in US dollars. G is the growth rate computed by annual log sales growth. Industry segment is defined by SIC code as in Table 2 Robust z statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Where the dependent variable, Payer, equals 1 if the firm pays dividends, otherwise equals zero. RE is the retained earnings divided by total equity. ROA is the net income divided by total assets. Cash is the cash balance scaled by total assets. TE is the shareholders' equity scaled by total assets. Size is the log of total assets in US dollars. G is the growth rate computed by annual log sales growth. SR, and CR are shareholder rights and creditor rights from Djankov et al. (2008) Robust z statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Where the dependent variable, Div_S, is the cash dividends divided by sales. RE is the retained earnings divided by total equity. ROA is the net income divided by total assets. Cash is the cash balance scaled by total assets. TE is the shareholders' equity scaled by total assets. Size is the log of total assets in US dollars. G is the growth rate computed by annual log sales growth. SR, and CR are shareholder rights and creditor rights from Djankov et al. (2008) Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Where X is a vector of country level variables. STKGDP, the stock market capitalization to GDP, is from World Bank. GOV_QUAL is the regulation quality of government, obtained from Kaufmann et al (2007) . OWNER_CON is the ownership concentration index from LLSV (1998). The dependent variable, MeanAdjDiv_S, is the country mean of residuals of the following model (with firm subscription suppressed):
where Div_S is cash dividends divided by total sales. RE is the retained earnings scaled by total assets. ROA is the net income divided by total assets. Cash is the cash balance scaled by total assets. TE is the shareholders' equity scaled by total assets. Size is the log of total assets in US dollars. G is the growth rate computed by annual log sales growth. SR, and CR are shareholder rights and creditor rights from Djankov et al. (2008) and Djankov et al. (2007) , respectively. LR is the labor rights from Botero et al. (2004) Robust t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
